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COMMENTS
POST-VERDICT INTERVIEWS: THE KEY TO
UNDERSTANDING THE DECISION BEHIND
THE VERDICT
CHRISTINE J. IVERSEN*
Don't you think the public's entitled to know the unusual currents
that are swirling amongst the jury panel?... Weren't you surprised
when you asked people to be sequestered for six to eight months, and
we had people volunteering?
Judge Lance Ito'
INTRODUCTION
Millions of people throughout the world collectively held their
breath for a few suspenseful seconds as the court clerk slowly announced the jury's verdict: a panel of nine African-Americans, two
Caucasians and one Hispanic2 found defendant Orenthal James
Simpson "not guilty" of the stabbing deaths of his former wife Ni3
After the verdict,
cole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman.
lights and news
microphones,
by
surrounded
jurors,
some of the
helicopters, met with the press to discuss their decision." Several
jurors felt that the prosecution's evidence was simply not enough
5
to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. One O.J. juror said that the
* J.D. Candidate, 1998.
1. 1 JAMES C. GOODALE, 1 COMMUNICATIONS LAW 28-29 (1995).
2. Vincent J. Schodolski, Simpson Jurors: Police Lost Case; They Concluded That 'it was Garbagein, Garbageout' With Tainted Evidence From Police Who Lied, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1995, § 1, at 1.
3. Nomi Morris, Beyond The Verdict, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 16, 1995, at 40.
4. Timothy Egan, With Spotlight Shifted To Them, Some Simpson Jurors
Talk Freely, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at Al; See generally Schodolski, supra
note 2 (noting that jurors spoke to the media after the verdict).
5. Morris, supra note 3, at 40. Several jurors stated that the jury was
very skeptical of the scientific evidence, including the blood, because the jury
believed the evidence to be tainted due to "sloppy handling." Schodolski, supra note 2. Another O.J. juror stated the panel's decision that Detective Mark
Fuhrman, a witness for the prosecution, was a racist, and therefore not
credible, was based upon a letter written to one of Simpson's attorneys. Id.
This letter stated that the author of the letter repeatedly heard Fuhrman
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prosecution had not met its burden of proof and she believed that
Another juror quoted the
O.J. had not actually killed Nicole
closing refrain of O.J. Simpson's defense lawyer, Johnnie Cochran:
"In plain English, the gloves didn't fit."'
Several accounts reported very little "give-and-take" among
the O.J. jurors the morning of their deliberations.' Initially, the
jurors took a straw poll during the beginning of their deliberations.9 Ten out of twelve jurors voted to acquit.'0 According to one
juror, one of the two members voting to convict O.J. was Caucasian, but the juror would not identify the dissenter." Jurors from
the O.J. Simpson criminal trial are not alone in their decision to
speak out.
Today, jurors frequently discuss their collective decision with
the public through the media. 12 Jurors from the trials for the
beating of Reginald Denny13 and Rodney King;" and from the trials
of Lorena Bobbit,' the Menendez brothers" and John Hinkley, Jr.
have publicly appeared on both local and national television shows
such as Good Morning America 8 and The Oprah Winfrey Show. 9

make racist comments regarding African-Americans. Id.
6. Egan, supra note 4.
7. Morris, supra note 3, at 41; see also Schodolski, supra note 2 (stating

that the O.J. jurors did not accept the prosecution's claim that Simpson's violence against his former wife was sufficient evidence of motive because the
last documented incidents of abuse occurred so long ago).
8. Egan, supra note 4.
9. Id.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Kenneth B. Nunn, When Juries Meet The Press: Rethinking the Jury's
RepresentativeFunction in Highly Publicized Cases, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
405, 406 (1995).

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 407; see also Kenneth B. Noble, Menendez Brothers Found Guilty
Of Killing Their Parents in 1989, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at Al (stating
that during "print and television interviews after the first trial," each
brother's jury indicated that they "could not choose between a [first-degree]
murder and manslaughter verdict[]" because the jury questioned "how seri-

ously the brothers had been abused and the extent to which that abuse justified their actions.").
17. Daniel Aaron, The First Amendment and Post-Verdict Interviews, 20
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 203, 203 (1986); see also VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL
VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 183 (1987). According to the authors, because of

the unpopularity of the jury's verdict (not guilty by reason of insanity), many
jurors felt the need to defend themselves and subsequently spoke to the media. Id. at 183. Others, in an unprecedented move, volunteered to testify before a Senate Subcommittee about their views of the insanity defense. Id.
18. Abraham Goldstein, Jury Secrecy And The Media: The Problem of Post
Verdict Interviews, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 295 (1993).
19. Morris, supra note 3, at 41.
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Jurors have also spoken on syndicated radio programs0 and many
have even held personal news conferences.2'
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether the press has a First Amendment' right of access
to jurors' names and addresses after a verdict.u As a result, courts
are unsure of whether the press' newsgathering right under the
First Amendment is broad enough to encompass post-verdict access to jurors. Some courts are wary of recognizing this postverdict access as a First Amendment right because of other important interests that clash with the press' newsgathering interest,
Two of the courts' main concerns include the accused's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial' and the concern for the individual
juror's right to privacy.28 Some courts, after balancing these interests against the press' right of access, hold that the press has a
right of access to the names and addresses of jurors after a verdict.27 Other courts, unconvinced that the press has a First
Amendment right of post-verdict access, hold that the press has no
right to speak to the jurors after the verdict.'
20. Two Simpson Jurors Cite a Lack of Proof, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1995, at
A19.
21. Egan, supra note 4.
22. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
23. See Aaron, supra note 17, at 204 (noting that federal courts have begun
addressing the issue of media access to juror information).
24. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 91 (1st Cir. 1990); United
States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Doherty, 675
F. Supp. 719, 723-24 (D. Mass. 1987).
25. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory processes for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 721.
27. Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d at 98; In re Express-News Corp., 695
F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1982); Sherman, 581 F.2d at 1361.
28. Harrelson,713 F.2d at 1118; 1 GOODALE, supra note 1, at 26-27. Goodale explains the reasoning behind the court's decision in Michigan v.
Mitchell, No. 95-3822-FC (July 10, 1995). Id. at 26. "After the jury returned
guilty verdicts" in the much-publicized "Ann Arbor serial rapist" trial, the
court refused to disclose juror names and addresses. Id. The court stated its
decision for non-disclosure was "to prevent harassment" and "to protect juror
privacy." Id. However, the court failed to cite any "evidence of actual or
threatened harassment." Id. at 26-27. The court stated that "the need for
[juror] privacy ...

is real, and ...

the media's seemingly insatiable demand

for unlimited intrusions into these citizens' lives must finally give way."' Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[30:507

This Comment addresses the issue of whether the press has a
First Amendment right of access to jurors after a verdict, and if so,
what ramifications arise from the implication of First Amendment
protection. Part I sets forth the history of the press' First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings and explores recent
cases involving the question of post-verdict access. Part II discusses the reasons some courts are wary of recognizing the press'
First Amendment right of post-verdict access. Finally, Part III
suggests a policy that enables courts to impound juror names and
addresses for a specific period after the verdict. This policy reconciles the courts' concerns surrounding post-verdict interviews
with protecting the press' guaranteed First Amendment right.
I.

HISTORY: "EXTRA! EXTRA!" NEWSGATHERING RIGHTS EXPANDED
In the 1972 case Branzburg v. Hayes, 9 the United States Supreme Court recognized a protected First Amendment right in
newsgathering.' ° Since then, the Court has gradually expanded
this newsgathering right to include most aspects of the criminal
trial; however, the Court has yet to address the specific question of
post-verdict interviews."' Without guidelines to follow when deciding the issue of whether the press has a right to post-verdict access, courts struggle to balance the clashing interests in hopes of
finding a satisfactory middle ground for all of the parties involved.
Section A examines the history of the press' right of access as set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. FirstAmendment Expansion to CriminalTrials:Richmond

Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia," the Supreme

Court added substance to the press' newsgathering right by extending an explicit right of access to criminal trials for the first
time." The Court, in a plurality opinion, reasoned that both the
press and the public have a protected First Amendment right to

at 27.
29. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
30. Id. at 681. The Branzburg Court stated, "[wie do not question the significance of free speech, press or assembly to the country's welfare. Nor is it
suggested that newsgathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated." Id.
31. See generally Aaron, supra note 17, at 222-27 (discussing the extension
of press access to voir dire, cases involving sexual misconduct with a minor
and to trial proceedings in general). In the cases following the Branzburg decision, "the press attempted to use the first amendment right of access as a
sword to obtain information." Id. at 219.
.32. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
33. Id. at 573.
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attend criminal trials." The Richmond Newspapers Court's decision relied on historical practice 3 and logical deduction.36 The
Court "focus[ed] on the effect that the trial might have on the pub7
lic rather than on the effect the public might have on the trial.""
The Richmond Newspapers Court set forth "three objective
reasons why criminal trials should be opened" to the public. 38 The
first reason for openness is to protect the accused from
"oppression," and to reinforce the public's perception of judicial
fairness. ' The second reason is to "provid[e] an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion."0 Finally, the third reason
is to inform the community about the justice system in general.4 '
In discussing the First Amendment right of access, the Richmond Newspapers Court noted, "any privilege of access to government information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the
nature of the information and countervailing interests in security
or confidentiality."" The Court stated that the right to gather information must be weighed according to the information sought
and the opposing interests invaded.4' The Richmond Newspapers
Court set forth a two-prong test to determine whether a First
Amendment right of access exists.4' The first prong consists of
exploring the history and tradition of public access to the informa34. Id. at 580.

35. Id. at 569. The Richmond Newspapers Court stated that the openness
of the criminal trial has long been recognized as "an indispensable attribute of
an Anglo-American trial." Id.
36. Nunn, supra note 12, at 419.
37. Id.
38. Id.

39. Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571
(1980)). In Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court stated:
The open trial thus plays as important a role in the administration of
justice today as it did for centuries before our separation from England.
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending
trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed;
the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that
established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public con-

fidence in the system.
464 U.S. 501, 508 (1980) (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 569-71 (1984)).
40. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571. The Richmond Newspapers

Court stated that an open public trial allows public outrage in response to
criminal conduct to be manifested in a form of "self-help." Id.
41. Nunn, supra note 12, at 420. The Richmond Newspapers Court proclaimed, "People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572.
42. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586.
43. Id. at 588.

44. Id. at 588-89.
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tion.' The second prong consists of determining "whether the access to a particular government process is important in terms of
that very process. ' Using this two-prong test, the Richmond
Newspapers Court held that the First Amendment guarantees the
press' right to attend criminal trials based upon the tradition of
openness and the important contributions of public understanding
that an open trial creates. 7
The Supreme Court has used the Richmond Newspapers twoprong-right-of-access test and variants of the test over the years to
expand the newsgathering right to almost all aspects of the criminal trial. In Press-Enterprisev. Superior Court48 (Press-Enterprise
I) the Court narrowed the Richmond Newspapers test slightly to
enable the media to attend the voir dire examination of potential
jurors.4 9 The Press-Enterprise I Court stated that only an
"overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest" can overcome the presumption of openness.' °
In another case involving the Press-Enterprise Co., the Court
held that First Amendment newsgathering rights include the right

45. Id. at 589. The Richmond Newspapers Court stated that the tradition
of accessibility to the information or the proceeding implies the continued
practice of openness. Id.
46. Id.

47. Id. at 573; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596 (1982). In Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court determined that a statute excluding the press and the general public from proceedings involving
specified sexual offenses against a victim under the age of 18 violated the
First Amendment newsgathering right. Id. at 598. The Globe Newspaper

Court applied the two-prong access test it had set forth in Richmond Newspapers. Id. at 605. The Court first recognized the historical openness of the
criminal trial. Id. The Court also recognized that significant role the right of

access to criminal proceedings has on the judicial process as a whole. Id. at

606. The Globe Court then set forth a more "narrow" test to use when courts
deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information. Id. The Court stated that courts must necessitate this denial of access
by a "compelling government interest and [one that] is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest." Id. at 607. Using this test, the Globe Court stated that
safeguarding the well-being of a minor does not meet the "compelling interest
test" so as to justify mandatory closure to the proceedings. Id. at 608. The
Globe Court held that the statute restricting public access to the proceedings

violated the First Amendment guarantee as it failed to meet the test. Id. at

610-11.
48. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
49. Id. at 513.
50. Id. at 510-11. The Press-EnterpriseI Court reviewed the history of the
juror selection process and noted that the process has a presumption of openness with exceptions only for "good cause shown." Id. at 509. The PressEnterprise I Court also stated that the interest must be "articulated along
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether
the closure order was properly entered." Id.
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5
to obtain information from a transcript of a preliminary hearing.
In Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court (Press-EnterpriseII), the

Court reviewed the two-prong test and determined that the press'
First Amendment protection extends to preliminary hearing tranThe Press-Enterprise II Court, considering the
scripts.Y
"experience and logic"" of access to criminal proceedings, held that
5
4
a First Amendment right of access attaches to these transcripts.
Although the United States Supreme Court has set out a two-

prong test to determine whether a right of access exists, courts do

not always apply this standard when deciding the post-verdict access question. Some courts use this test,55 others use a modified
version of this test, and still others simply fail to apply the twoprong test at all.57 The next Section explores and analyzes the different post-verdict cases and the assorted standards the courts
applied when the question of post-verdict access arose in their
courtrooms.
B. FirstAmendment Expansion to Post-VerdictAccess: United
States v. Sherman
In United States v. Sherman," the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expanded, for the first time, the First
Amendment newsgathering right to encompass post-verdict access
to jurors. 9 The Ninth Circuit held that a district court's order
prohibiting anyone, including the news media, from interviewing
the jurors was an unconstitutional violation of a protected right. ®
In Sherman, the district court found two members of the George
Jackson Brigade, an organization intent on destroying the government, guilty of armed bank robbery."' The Brigade received
much attention because it claimed responsibility for several rob51. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).
52. Id. at 10-13.

53. Id. at 8, 9. The Press-EnterpriseII Court reviewed the history of the
traditional openness of jury trials and the selection of jurors. Id. The PressEnterpriseII Court noted that access to preliminary hearing transcripts keeps
the public informed and this is an important role in society. Id. at 12-13.
54. Id. The Press-EnterpriseII Court stated, however, that the First
Amendment right of public access is not an absolute privilege. Id. at 9. The
Court reiterated that "the trial court must determine whether... the rights
of the accused [should] override the qualified First Amendment right of access. Id.
55. United States v. Butt, 753 F. Supp. 44, 45 (D. Mass. 1990); United
States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 722-23 (D. Mass. 1987).
56. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 97 (1st Cir. 1990); In re Express-News. Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982).
57. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1352 (3d Cir. 1994).
58. 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978).
59. Id. at 1359-61.
60. Id.

61. Id. at 1359.
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beries and bombings in the Seattle area. 2 The Seattle news media
covered the trial extensively.' After the verdict, the district court
forbade the jurors from discussing the case with anyone, assured
the jurors protection from harassment and ordered everyone, including the news media, to distance themselves from the jurors."
The press appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the government made three arguments defending the district
court's decision. First, the government argued that allowing the
press post-verdict access to the jurors would deprive the defendants of a fair trial.& Second, the government declared that allowing the press post-verdict access to the jurors would prevent them
from serving on future jury panels." Finally, the government asserted that the jurors needed protection from the press' postverdict access for harassment reasons.67
All three arguments failed to meet the heavy burden necessary to sustain the order. 4 The Ninth Circuit considered the "free
press-fair trial" issue inapplicable since the trial had ended.' The
court of appeals also concluded the inability of jurors to serve on
future juries was not such a serious or imminent threat to justify
prior restraint. 70 Finally, the Ninth Circuit did not recognize the
jury's need of protection from harassment as a clear and present
danger.71 Viewing the order as "too broad" and clearly erroneous
as a matter of law,72 the court of appeals issued the press' writ of
mandamus. 73 The next Section discusses how one Circuit Court
overcame the overbreadth problem by adopting a "narrowly tai-

62. Id.
63. Id. at 1360.
64. Id. The Seattle Times "attempted to persuade the [court] to modify or
retract [its] order." Id. After failing in their attempt, the Seattle Times "filed
a notice of appeal, and in the alternative, petitioned for a writ of mandamus"
with the Sherman court. Id. Since the district court's order "clearly restrained the media in their attempts to gather news," which is "an activity
protected by the First Amendment," the government's burden was a heavy
one. Id. at 1361. In order to sustain the burden, the government needed to
show that the restrained activity posed a "clear and present danger or a serious and imminent threat to a protected competing interest". Id. Also, the restraint needed to be narrowly drawn and "no reasonable alternatives, having
a lesser impact on First Amendment freedoms, must [have been] available."
Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1361. The Sherman court also stated that there were reasonable
alternatives available, such as excusing the jurors from further service, which
would have had a lesser impact on First Amendment freedoms. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1361-62.
73. Id. at 1362.

1997]

Post-VerdictInterviews

lored" standard when reviewing restrictions on the media's right to
gather news.
C. Application of the "NarrowlyTailored"Test:In re ExpressNews Corporation
Almost four years after Sherman, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit faced another challenge on barring post-verdict interviews in In re Express-News Corp.7' Here, a jury convicted two
defendants of transporting and conspiracy to transport illegal aliens.75 Pursuant to a local court rule, the trial court imposed restrictions on the press' access to jurors."6 Petitioning the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus, Express-News argued that the
district court's rule violated its constitutional right to gather
news. 77 The Fifth Circuit, while recognizing that the right to
gather news is not absolute,"8 held that the media's right to gather
news can only be restricted by a narrowly tailored court rule preventing a substantive threat to the administration of justice.8
Applying this test, the appeals court found that the district
court's local rule restricted the freedom of the press to gather news
and the freedom of those jurors who wanted to talk about their
service.& The local rule also forbade all types of communication
with the jurors and was unlimited in time and scope."' The Fifth
Circuit held that a court may not impose such a broad restraint,
one which requires "those who would speak freely to justify special
treatment by carrying the burden of showing 'good cause."' 2 The
court furthermore held that the First Amendment right to gather
news is "good cause," 3 and if they choose to do so, jurors are free to
discuss their service. 8' The Fifth Circuit then declared Local Rule
500-2 unconstitutional because without any showing that the restriction was necessary, the rule restricted the press' right to
gather news. In another circuit, the court's focus shifted to ana74. 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982).
75. Id. at 808.

76. Id. "Local Rule 500-2 of the Western District provides that no person
shall 'interview ...any juror, relative, friend or associate thereof ...with
respect to the deliberations or verdict of the jury in any action, except on

leave of court granted upon good cause shown.'" Id. A reporter for the Express-News Corporation filed a motion to vacate the restriction prohibiting
interviews of the jurors, which was denied. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 809.
79. Id. at 810.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 811; see Journal Publ'g Co. v. E.L. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236-

37 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that lower court's press restrictions were imper-
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missibly overbroad). In Journal Publishing, district judge E.L. Mechem admonished the jurors at the close of a controversial trial by stating:
You should not discuss your verdict after you leave here with anyone. If
anyone tries to talk to you about it, or wants to talk to you about it, let
me know. If they wish [to] take the matter up with me, why, they may
do so, but otherwise, don't discuss it with anyone.
Id. at 1235.
Journal Publishing requested the trial court to change or abrogate its order, but the trial court refused. Id. Journal Publishing then filed a motion for
leave to interview the jurors, and when denied, Journal Publishing consequently petitioned the Journalcourt for a writ of mandamus. Id. The Journal Publishingcourt first reviewed the history of protecting dismissed jurors
from attorneys and parties interested in casting doubt on the verdict. Id. at
1236. Subsequently, the Journal Publishing court recognized that a court
"does not have the same freedom to restrict" the press' access to jurors as it
does with respect to attorneys or interested parties because the press "has
less incentive to upset [the) verdict." Id. The court found that the trial
court's order included "every possible juror interview situation" without any
time or scope limitations. Id. Since the trial court's order was "impermissibly
overbroad," the Journal court granted Journal Publishing's petition. Id. at
1236-37.
See also Ohio ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Court of Common Pleas, 570
N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1991). In this case, the press "challeng[ed] the constitutionality of a trial court's post-verdict order that 'no one is to talk to the jurors
about the case, and the jurors aren't to talk to anybody about it." Id. at 1102.
The Cincinnati Post court stated that the trial court's order was "too broad"
and not "narrowly focus[ed]". Id. at 1104. The Ohio Supreme Court held that
"the order issued... violate[d the First Amendment" right of the press and
allowed a writ of prohibition. Id. at 1105.
Cf United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1987). This case was
the second trial in which the governor and his co-defendants were charged
with racketeering and bribery. Id. at 113. The first trial, which generated
much publicity, ended in a mistrial when the jury could not reach a unanimous decision. Id. Rumors that the jurors were bribed tainted the first trial.
Id. During the course of the second trial, jury misconduct was alleged; one
juror spoke of bribery and another juror was under the impression that one of
the defendants was offering bribes. Id. The district court ordered closed
questioning of these jurors, sealed the record, imposed a ban on public comments of the proceedings and permanently sealed portions of the record, including juror names and addresses. Id. at 113-14. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that "no presumption of openness" attached to this type of
proceeding. Id. at 117. The court also held that "the First Amendment guarantees a limited right of access to the record of closed proceedings concerning
potential jury misconduct." Id. at 118. The Fifth Circuit stated that if a trial
court denied post-trial disclosure of a requested transcript, the court must
make specific its reasoning and demonstrate a "substantial probability that
higher values will be prejudiced and that reasonable alternatives cannot adequately protect those values." Id. at 119. The court stated that the interest in
maintaining the juries impartiality was "paramount." Id. Therefore, the
court held that the district court made no error by refusing to release juror
names with the transcript, as the transcript themselves would reveal "the
substance ...of the issues." Id. at 120.
See also United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133, 1145 (N.D. Ind.
1982) (concluding that a court's order, which enjoined all trial participants
and others from interrogating both the alternate and paneled jurors, 'may arguably' have conflicted with rights protected by the First Amendment, and
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lyzing the justifications for prohibiting press access to jurors.
D. Application of the "Interests-of-Justice"Standard:In re Globe
Newspaper Company
A battle between the press and a district court's order denying
post-verdict access to names and addresses of jurors occurred in In

thus resulting in a new order). But see United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d
1114 (5th Cir. 1983). In Harrelson, a jury found three defendants "guilty of
various acts and conspiracies" regarding a United States district judge's murder. Id. at 1115. Pursuant to Local Rule 500-2, the district court admonished
prohibited everyone from questioning any juror. Id. The press filed a motion
requesting that the district court vacate enforcement of the rule, which the
court denied. Id. During this time, the Fifth Circuit in In Re Express-News
Corp. held that the local rule was unconstitutional. Id. at 1115. In response
to the Express-News court's holding, the press fied a Motion to Vacate Memorandum Opinion and Order in the district court. Id. at 1115-16. The district
court denied the motion, reasoning that the Express Court's "decision was not
yet final." Id. at 1116. When the Express court issued the mandate in Express and the decision was final, the district court partially sustained the
press' second motion to vacate the court's order restricting interviews with
former jurors. Id. The district court's order, however, imposed four restrictions on post-verdict interviews:
1. No juror has any obligation to speak to any person about this case,
and may refuse all interviews or comment.
2. No person may make repeated requests for interviews or questioning
after a juror has expressed his or her desire not to be interviewed.
3. No interviewer may inquire into the specific vote of any juror other
than the juror being interviewed.
4. No interview may take place until each juror in this case has received a copy of this order, mailed simultaneously with the entry of this
order.
Id.
On appeal, the press focused on restrictions two and three. Id. The press
maintained that the court's order restrained them but not others. Id. at 1116.
The Harrelsoncourt did not agree, stating that the language of the order was
broad enough to include everyone, not just the press. Id. at 1117. The press
also argued that the no finding of substantial threat to the administration of
justice had been made prior to the court's order. Id. The Harrelson court
disagreed. Id. The court stated that the judge is the "governor for the purpose of insuring its [the jury trial's] proper conduct." Id. A hearing was unnecessary, as it was obvious the trial was a widely publicized one, and the district court's order could be supported without such a proceeding. Id. The
Harrelson court held that the ban on repeated requests for interviews was a
fair restriction as the jurors "are entitled to privacy and protection against
harassment," even after the jurors completed their service. Id. at 1118 (citing
In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982)). The Harrelson
court concluded that the ban was well within the district court's discretion
and the press enjoys no special access right to matters not available to the
general public. Id. The Harrelson court denied mandamus and affirmed the
district court's order. Id.; see also Newsday, Inc. v. Sise, 518 N.E.2d 930, 933
(N.Y. 1987) (holding that juror names and addresses obtained from juror
qualification questionnaires, which are protected from disclosure by Judiciary
Law section 509(a), may not be revealed).
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re Globe Newspaper Co.' In Globe Newspaper, a jury convicted
two defendants of conspiracy to conceal illegal drug profits from
the Internal Revenue Service.87 The district court kept the records
listing the names and addresses of the jurors confidential during
the trial." Immediately after the verdict and the jury's discharge,
the district court advised the jurors that the press may contact
them. The court also suggested that the jurors keep the results of
their deliberations secret.9 In interpreting section 10(c) of the District of Massachusetts Plan for Random Selection of Jurors, the
First Circuit found that the district court must make jury information available, unless the presiding judge points out specific
valid reasons for denying access.90 To justify impoundment after a
verdict, a court must find a "significant threat to the judicial process itself."1 The First Circuit stated that, but for the jurors own
preferences and the district court's distaste for exposing them to
the media, the district court did not identify any special reason for
denying access to the press.' Although the First Circuit recognized the district court's concern that the press would specifically
question the jurors about their deliberations, the First Circuit
noted that this possibility could not justify withholding juror identities.93 The court held that because the district court's reasons for
withholding juror identities failed to meet the interests-of-justice
standard,' the district court must make juror names and ad-

86. 920 F.2d 88, 90 (1st Cir. 1990).
87. Id. at 90.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court stated:
Members of the jury, the press may call you. It is up to you whether to
speak with them. My suggestion is this, though: These are very grave
matters. You have deliberated as a body, in confidence, and it is best
that the result of your deliberations should remain in confidence.
Id.
Reporters sought access to the jurors names and addresses the day of the
verdict and were refused. Id. The Globe's motion to intervene and to obtain
the list of jurors was also denied by the district court. Id. at 90. The Globe
then filed an appeal and petitioned for a writ of mandamus with the Globe
court. Id.
90. Id. at 91.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 98. The court stated that "we construe the interests-of-justice
standard as requiring that the trial court find specific and convincing reasons
why, in the particular case, the juror identities are required to be withheld."
Id. at 93. The court also noted the Supreme Court's narrowing of the interests-of-justice standard: "It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a
federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative
interpretation poses no constitutional question." Id. (citing Gomez v. United
States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989)).
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dresses available to the public.95 Three years before Globe Newspaper, one district court attempted to reconcile the many competing interests.
E. Use of the "Right Of Access" Test: United States v. Doherty
In United States v. Doherty," the district court held that the

best way to balance the competing interests between the press, the
accused and the jurors was to impound juror identities for a specific time period after the rendering of a verdict. 7 In Doherty, a
jury returned a guilty verdict in a seventeen-week trial against
several defendants. 98 The district court impounded the juror
names and addresses during the selection process and throughout
the trial." Although their service was complete and they were free
to discuss the case, the court suggested to the jurors that the actual deliberation process remain confidential.'" Two newspapers
seeking access to the discharged jury members sought to have the
impoundment of the jurors' names and addresses lifted immediately.10' The court weighed the press' right to gather news against
the right of the accused to receive a fair trial, the safeguarding of
the jury system and the protection of the jurors themselves.'"
First, the court recognized that the press' First Amendment
right encompasses the right of public access to jurors and concluded that the public has a general right to juror access sometime
after the delivery of the verdict. 103 Additionally, the court bal95. Id. at 98. The court refused to entertain Globe's appeal from denial of
the trial judge's order because Globe was never a party to the criminal proceeding below. Id. at 90. The First Circuit also withheld the actual issuance

of the writ of mandamus as the court was confident the district court would
comply with its directions. Id. at 98.
96. 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987).
97. Id. at 724-25.
98. Id. at 720.
99. Id.

100. Id. at 721. After discharge, the jurors described to the court "their
unanimous desire not to have their names and home addresses disclosed to

the press." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 723-24.
103. United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 723 (D. Mass. 1987). The
court stated:
It is important for the public to receive information about the operation

of the administration of justice, including information about the actual

people who do render justice in the truest sense of the word. Access to
information not only serves the cause of justice generally by providing
an independent, non-governmental verification of the utter impartiality
of the process involved in selecting jurors and shielding them from improper influences, it also serves to enhance the operation of the jury
system itself by educating the public as to their own duties and obligations should they be called for jury service.
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anced the press' First Amendment right against the interests of
the accused in receiving a fair trial, the judicial system in protecting the secrecy of jury deliberations and the individual jurors in
maintaining their privacy."M The court held that it would lift its
order of impoundment concealing the jurors' names and addresses
seven days after the return of the verdict.'
Thus, the court
granted the motions of the press and lifted the impoundment order
with limitations. 1
The preceding Part demonstrates that courts use different
standards when answering the question of whether the press has a
right of access to jurors after a verdict. Courts are wary of implying a First Amendment right of access to jurors because other im104. Id. at 724. The court reasoned that courts must maintain the integrity
of the proceedings and not allow a possible "carnival atmosphere" to interfere
with the accused's fair trial by an impartial jury. Id. at 723. The court also
stated both the court and the State have an interest in protecting juror privacy, even after trial, to promote honesty in subsequent juries. Id. at 724.
105. Id. at 725. The court noted: "apostponement of one week will not injure
the values to be furthered by a searching press inquiry into the lives of the jurors." Id. The seven day break allows jurors to return to their activities, while
granting them a chance to reflect upon their service to determine whether or not
they wish to speak to the press. Id.
See also United States v. Butt, 753 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1990). In Butt, a
reporter sought the names and addresses of the jurors immediately following
the return of a guilty verdict. Id. at 45. The court stated that while the press
had every right to the jurors' names and addresses, delaying their disclosure
was appropriate for this brief period. Id. The court reasoned that postponing
of the release of juror names and addresses would not injure the values
served by the press. Id. Simultaneously, the seven day break allows each juror time to determine whether the juror will participate in any post-verdict
interview. Id. at 46. The court held that "[Ilifting the impoundment order
seven days after the return of a verdict thus accommodates all the relevant
interests without the necessity of balancing one against the other." Id. at 46.
See also Sullivan v. National Football League, 839 F. Supp. 6 (D. Mass.
1993). In Sullivan, a well-publicized case, the Boston Herald sought access to
jurors' names and addresses after the verdict was rendered. Id. at 7. The
court sought to accommodate the promotion of the press' First Amendment
values, while protecting the litigants' right to a fair trial and minimizing the
invasion of the jurors' privacy. Id. The court held that revealing the juror
names and addresses ten days after the return of a verdict would accommodate all three interests. Id. The court, applying the same reasoning as did
the Doherty and the Butt courts, granted the press' motion to lift the access
order ten days after the verdict. Id.
106. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 725-26. The court "stayed the motion to lift
the impoundment until May 15, 1987" [seven days after verdict]; by this date,
each juror would have received a copy of the court's order stating:
1) any juror may refuse any interview request of him or her;
2) should a juror indicate that he or she does not wish to be interviewed,
no further inquiry or attempt to seek the interview from that juror will
be permitted by that newsgathering organization;
3) no interview may take place until May 15, 1987, when each juror
shall have received a copy of this courts order.
Id. at 725-26.
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portant interests such as the interests of the accused and the privacy interests of jurors clash with the press' First Amendment
right. These opposing interests weigh intensely upon a court and
create heavy burdens when deciding the post-verdict access issue.
Part II analyzes the concerns that courts consider when deciding
whether post-verdict access is a constitutionally protected right.
II. ANALYSIS: THE HEAVY BURDENS UPON A COURT
When deciding whether the press has a protected right of access to jurors after a verdict, courts must consider other interests
aside from the press' right to gather news. However, no two courts
use the same tests or the same standards when weighing the opposing interest."7 The Doherty court categorized the competing interests into three major conflicting groups representing the important issues at stake. 1° Those interests include the public's First
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings as advanced by
the media, the concern for each juror's personal privacy" and the
accused's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial."0
The first Section discusses the concerns of courts regarding
the suppression of free debate caused by allowing the media access
to jurors after a verdict. The second Section considers the injuries
to the jury system as a whole occasioned by media access to jurors.
The third Section examines the concern regarding the individual
members of a jury and the preservation of judicial integrity. The
fourth Section explains the theory that post-verdict interviews
may coerce a jury to follow "public opinion." The fifth Section explores the potential synergy between post-verdict interviews and
"checkbook journalism." Finally, the sixth Section discusses the
impact of post-verdict interviews on a criminal defendant's rights.
A. The Concern thatfree Debate Will Be Stifled
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the
First Amendment prevents the government from closing courtroom doors that have traditionally been open to the public."' Yet
while criminal proceedings themselves are open to the public and
the press, the jurors deliberate behind closed doors."' Those who
oppose post-verdict interviews express concern that, although deliberations are closed to the public, jurors may feel threatened by
the media's attention."' Opponents of the interviews believe that
jurors will be unable to engage in uninhibited discussions because
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Aaron, supra note 17, at 213.
Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 721.
Id.
Id.
Aaron, supra note 17, at 223.
Id. at 229.
In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 96-7 (1st Cir. 1990).
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they fear the world will know of their positions." Opponents are
also concerned that the press' access to jurors will stifle free debate, which is the basis of the decision-making process. 1 5 The fol114. Id. The court in Globe Newspaper stated that it is undisputed that the
secrecy of jury deliberations allow free, open and candid debate in reaching a
decision. Id. at 94; Goldstein, supra note 18, at 296. In his article, Goldstein
argues that although jurors are told before they retire that their deliberations
will be conducted in secret and they are not to speak with anyone regarding
the case, jurors now expect to be interviewed about their reasoning. Id. at
296-97; see also Robert Lloyd Raskopf, A FirstAmendment Right of Access to a
Juror's Identity: Toward a Fuller Understanding of the Jury's Deliberative
Process, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 357, 377 (1990) (noting that opponents argue that
jurors will be unable to engage in uninhibited discussions if the press is allowed to conduct post-verdict interviews).
115. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1355 (3d Cir. 1994). In Antar,
the district court sealed the transcript of the jury voir dire after a fraud trial.
Id. at 1350. The court weighed the historical practice of open recognition of
juror identities against the compelling interest of protecting both the secrecy
of jury deliberations and the jurors themselves. Id. Five months after the
trial, the district court unsealed the voir dire transcripts but placed four restrictions on the press. Id. at 1354. The district court's limitations were:
(1) [N]o juror [was] under any obligation to grant an interview nor may
any juror be compelled to do so, ...

(2) [Rlepeated requests of a juror for an interview [was] strictly prohibited, ...
(3) [Once a juror expresse[d] a desire to conclude an interview already
in progress, that interviewer must immediately cease all questioning
[and]
(4) [N]o inquiry may be made into specific votes, statements, opinions or
other comments of any juror during deliberations other than the juror
being interviewed.
Id. at 1355.
The district court, in limiting the press, stated that "the restriction [1
serve[s] to guard against a future juror's reluctance to openly share his or her
opinions for fear that those opinions will be revealed by fellow jurors to all inquiring minds. Id. The district court, however, also made no attempt to hide
its distaste for the media's interest in the post-verdict interviews by stating
that the press' only purpose in conducting these interviews is to "[slell newspapers." Id. at 1354. Finally, the district court's opinion sets out a letter sent
to each juror explaining that their names and addresses were going to be released, warning them that the press would likely be contacting them and suggesting that the jurors keep their deliberations confidential. Id. at 1355. This
letter is the first of its kind ever issued by a federal court. Robert Rudolph,
Media Plea Fails to Halt Federal Judge's Letter Asking Jurors to Stay Mum
Request in 'Crazy Eddie' Case Believed to be a First, THE STAR LEDGER, Dec.
11, 1993, at B6.

On appeal, the press argued that the district court did not hold a hearing
and failed to follow the Press-Enterprisetest: a compelling need for such an
order, no alternative to the restrictions, an order narrowly tailored to meet
the compelling need and an order that is effective. Joseph A. Slobodzian,
Press Appeals Jury Restrictions, 16 NAT.'L L. J., Apr. 11, 1994, at A2. The
Antar court reversed the district court's original sealing order and the second
and third restrictions on juror contacts by the press. Antar, 38 F.3d at 1364.
The court in Antar held that those restrictions were impermissible in the absence of findings by the trial court that harassment has occurred or was in-
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lowing Section discusses the benefits derived from educating the
public and exposing jury misunderstandings through the use of
post-verdict interviews.
1.

The Benefits of JudicialSystem Education Via Post-Verdict
Interviews

While the suppression of free debate is cause for concern, access to jurors enhances the function of the jury system itself by
educating the public as to the nature of jury duty."' If courts allow
the jury to communicate with the public through the media, people
unfamiliar with the operation of the justice system gain knowledge
of their own duties and obligations as a fact-finder in the judicial
system."7 Moreover, by allowing the public, vis-&-vis the press, to
access jurors, people not attending the trial can have confidence in
the rendering of justice."8 Thus, the public gains assurance that
the courts are conducting the proceedings fairly"9 and the opentended. Id. The court reasoned that since the district court failed to set forth
sufficient reasons to justify its restrictions on access to jurors, the restrictions
could not be upheld. Id. The court easily affirmed the first restriction. Id. at
1364. The Antar court also upheld the fourth restriction, although it said it
was "troubled" by the constraint. Id. The Antar court concluded that restrictions on post-verdict interviews must "reflect an impending threat of jury
harassment rather than a generalized misgiving about the wisdom of such interviews. Id.
See also United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 724 (D. Mass. 1987)
(stating that the free flowing process of juror debates may be "chilled" if jurors
think that a fellow juror may publicize the thoughts of others); Copernicus T.
Gaza, Getting Inside The Jury's Head: Media Access to JurorsAfter the Trial,

12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 311, 337 (1995) (noting that "public disclosure of
deliberations serves to undermine the jury process itself'); Public Disclosures
of Jury Deliberations,96 HARV. L. REV. 886, 889-90 (1983) (stating that the
decision-making process would be "crippled" without juror privacy).
116. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 723; Raskopf, supra note 114, at 371.
117. Nunn, supra note 12, at 428.
118. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 507 (1984)
(stating that this open process gave assurance to those not in attendance that
others are able to observe the proceedings); see also Globe Newspaper, 920
F.2d at 94 (stating "[knowledge of juror identities allows the public to verify
the impartiality of key participants in the administration of justice, and

thereby ensures fairness, the appearance of fairness and public confidence in
that system"); Antar, 38 F.3d at 1360 (stating that the basis for the Supreme
Court's protection of the media's rights is the media's crucial role of secondary
representation); Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 723 (noting the importance of the
public's access to information regarding the function of the judicial system);
Nunn, supra note 12, at 428 (discussing the benefits of educating others about
the judicial system through post-verdict interviews); Raskopf, supra note 114,
at 371 (stating that juror interviews shed light on what could be the most
critical phase of the criminal trial).

119. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986)

(stressing the importance of the openness of the criminal trial, which is essential to public confidence in the institution); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (stating that when a trial is openly con-
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ness has "community therapeutic value." 2 ' Citizens learn, through
post-verdict interviews, how the judicial branch of the government
functions. 2 ' In turn, this induces confidence in the system by
providing verification of the inner workings of the system." Public access to these procedures through the press 2 also serves as a
check upon the judicial process. 2' In addition, post-verdict interviews benefit society by revealing jurors' interpretations of the
evidence.
2.

The Benefit of Exposing MisunderstandingsWithin the Panel

Post-verdict interviews expose misinterpretations or misunderstandings among jurors themselves 2 ' and provide insight into
how a specific jury reached a particular decision." 6 Post-verdict
interviews benefit the system by educating both judges and attorneys on how to simplify instructions. 7 and improve the quality of
the evidence and arguments. 12 Post-verdict interviews allow attorneys to discover the "real turning point" in the trial"9 and to
critique their trial performance.'
Increased communication between judges, attorneys and jurors also provides a valuable pool of
information for gathering local, regional and national data dealing
ducted, society has an opportunity to understand the system both generally
and specifically within a particular case); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d
88, 94 (1st Cir. 1990) (declaring that information "obtained from the jurors
themselves educates the public regarding the judicial system" and can shed
light on its strengths, flaws and means to improve the system); Gaza, supra
note 115, at 314 (noting that knowledge of the judicial preserves its
"legitimacy").
120. Press-Enterprise,464 U.S. at 508.
121. Id.; Aaron, supra note 17, at 230.
122. Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980); Antar,
38 F.3d at 1360; Raskopf, supra note 114, at 371.
123. Antar, 38 F.3d at 1360. The Antar court stated that true public access
to a proceeding consists of knowledge of what occurred. Id. This knowledge
comes from first-hand witnessing, and also learning about it through a secondary source. Id. This secondary source is the media, which "functions as a
surrogate for the public." Id.
124. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606 (stating that our form of government necessitates this check upon the judicial process).
125. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 300-01; J. Stratton Shartel, Judge Went too
far in Limiting PressAccess to Jurors,INSIDE LITIG., Jan. 1994, at 2.
126. See Nunn, supra note 12, at 436 (stating post-verdict interviews reveal
whether the jury collectively believed certain instructions were influencing or
constraining during deliberations and which strategies used by the parties
were effective).
127. Shari S. Diamond, Instructions Frequently Baffle Jurors, NAT'L L.J.,
June 6, 1994, at C7; Shartel, supra note 125, at 2.
128. Marjorie Fargo, Don't Make the Same Mistake DeLorean's Prosecution
Made, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1988, at 2.

129. Id.
130. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 300-01; Major Holly M. Stone, Post-Trial
Contact with Court Members: A Critical Analysis, 38 A.F.L. REV. 179, 179-80
(1994).
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with frequently tried criminal issues.'3'
Both federal and state courts,'32 concerned with the possibility
of doubt being cast upon a jury's verdict, 33 regulate the contact attorneys may have with the jurors."34 However, post-verdict interviews conducted by attorneys are different from post-verdict interviews conducted by the press, because the media has "less
incentive to upset a verdict than does a losing party or attorney. " '35
While courts have broad discretion to limit attorney and party contact with the jury, courts do not have the same freedom to restrict
the press' right to interview jurors. 3"
Post-verdict interviews conducted by participating attorneys
can leave the attorney feeling defensive because he or she took the
juror's criticism too personally' 7 and the jurors feeling guilty be38
cause of the attorney's dismay at the uneducated decision.
Someone other than the immediate trial team however, can conduct this type of post-verdict interview. 9 The interviewer need
not be familiar with all of the details of the trial; the interviewer
need only rely on the juror to describe what happened during the
proceedings.' ° The benefits of a neutral interviewer make the impartial press a perfect party medium to shed light on the decision
and increase the understanding of all parties. More general concerns about the impact of post-verdict interviews on the jury system are also present.
B. Concern that Post-VerdictInterviews Will Injure the Entire
Jury System as a Process
Opponents of post-verdict interviews believe that future jurors may avoid jury duty if they observe jurors bombarded by the
media."' Fear exists that if courts allow the press access to jurors,
131. Fargo, supra note 128, at 38.
132. Stone, supra note 130, at 182.
133. See Journal Publ'g Co. v. E.L. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir.
1986) (stating that courts have routinely protected dismissed jurors from the
"fishing expeditions" of the losing attorney, who wishes to overturn the verdict).
134. See Stone, supra note 130, at 183 (stating some courts require a petition to be filed, or an attorney to possess a "reasonable belief" that a challenge
exists before an attorney may interview jurors); Fargo, supra note 128, at 38
(noting that attorneys and their agents should research the local rules of the
jurisdiction to determine whether or not there are any restrictions on press
access to dismissed jurors).
135. JournalPubl'g, 801 F.2d at 1236.
136. Id.
137. Paul M. Lisnek, Post-Trial Interviews Help Explain Verdicts, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., July 24 1995, at 6.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. PublicDisclosures of Jury Deliberations,supra note 115, at 889.
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those jurors will be unable to serve on future jury panels." Opponents also worry that exposure to the media will a less unbiased
attitude in future cases instill in these jurors.'
However, less restrictive alternatives, such as simply excusing a juror from future service, are available for consideration
rather than infringing upon a protected right.'" The potential inability to serve on a future jury panel is not such a "serious or
imminent threat" to justify a restraint on the press' access to juror
names and addresses.'45 While the inability to serve on a future
jury may not be a serious threat to the judicial system, compromising a juror's privacy is a justifiable concern.
C. The Concern for JurorPrivacy

Opponents of post-verdict access argue that individual jurors
will forfeit their right to privacy if courts allow the press postverdict access. '" Opponents are wary that the press will openly
harass, intimidate and coerce jurors into revealing discussions
that occurred inside the jury room. 47 Similarly, some opponents
are concerned with the jurors' safety-a concern that becomes
magnified in organized crime trials."8 This concern also surrounds
emotionally charged trials where the public already "convicts" the
defendant before the case comes to trial."9 Opponents believe that
if the jury members fear public scorn or harassment because of
their decisions, it will be difficult for the jurors to render an impartial verdict.'"
Concern for juror privacy does not justify restrictions on First
Amendment rights, and denying access to juror names and addresses will not eliminate this concern.' Privacy is strictly a matter of individual preference and opinion with each juror.'12 Individual jurors should have the right to determine whether the
142.
143.
144.
145.

United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978).
Aaron, supra note 17, at 232-33.
Sherman, 581 F.2d at 1361.
Id.'
146. Aaron, supra note 17, at 232; Gaza, supra note 115, at 316; Public Disclosure Of Jury Deliberations, supra note 115, at 889; Raskopf, supra note
114, at 375-76.
147. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3d Cir. 1994); Sherman,
581 F.2d at 1361; United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 720 (D. Mass.
1987); United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (D. Ind. 1982).
148. Gaza, supra note 115, at 316, 317; see also United States v. Ross, 33
F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that anonymous juries, while a
"drastic measure" may be used if there is a high risk to juror safety due to
such factors as the defendant's involvement in organized crime or extensive
media coverage).
149. Gaza, supra note 115, at 317.
150. Id. at 318.
151. Raspkof, supra note 114, at 377.
152. United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978).
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media's questions are an invasion of their privacy. 15 Some jurors
even enjoy the media's attention." Moreover, although intrusion
into a juror's privacy is a concern, a court cannot prematurely restrict the press because of possible harassment that has not yet occurred."u If harassment should occur, then the court undoubtedly
has the authority to correct the intrusion.'6 Further, each juror
maintains the prerogative to participate in post-verdict interviews. 157 Courts do not require jurors to speak to the media or
anyone else regarding their decision."' However, courts do consider the possibility that post-verdict interviews may coerce juries
into following "popular opinion."
D. The Concern Regarding a "PopularOpinion" Vote
Knowing that they are the focus of the media's attention, juries may reach verdicts based upon popular opinion.' " Even if juries do not succumb to popular opinion, they may modify their behavior during deliberations, intimidated by the thought of future
interrogation.' 6° Opponents think that a juror who realizes that
deliberations may become part of the public's knowledge is less
likely to argue for judgments contrary to public opinion. 161 Oppo153. Id.; Goldstein, supra note 18, at 303.
154. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1982).
After rendering a verdict for the defendants, one juror wrote an anonymous
letter to a Kentucky newspaper of general circulation. Id. at 212. In this letter, the juror first challenged the validity of the plaintiffs evidence and then
explained the reasons for his decision. Id.; Raspkof, supra note 114, at 376;
O.J. JurorPoses for Playboy, LONDON TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1995, at 15. The Times
reported that a woman dismissed from the O.J. Simpson jury posed for Playboy magazine on a photographic set resembling a courtroom. Id.
155. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3d Cir. 1994). The court
stated "[hiere, for example, the court's concern with harassment was hypothetical, as there was no evidence, or even allegation, of misbehavior by the
press." Id.
156. Id. at 1363; Sherman, 581 F.2d at 1361.
157. See Antar, 38 F.3d at 1364 (stating that "no juror is obliged, or may be
compelled, to grant an interview."); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88,
97 (1st Cir. 1990) (asserting that any juror may "flatly refus[e] press interviews when approached"); In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 811 (5th
Cir. 1982) (declaring that jurors have no affirmative duty to speak to the media regarding their service).
158. Sherman, 581 F.2d at 1361-62.
159. Gaza, supra note 115, at 315-16; see also Nunn, supra note 12, at 431.
Nunn argues that a risk exists that jurors may render decisions based upon
what the panel feels are "community desires." Id. "When jurors are aware
they will be thrust into the public eye at the end of their service, there is great
danger that their ability to exercise their own independent judgment may be
affected." Id.
160. Aaron, supra note 17, at 230; Nunn, supra note 12, at 429.
161. See Raskopf, supra note 114, at 377 (noting that "uninhibited jury deliberations would be threatened" by post-verdict interviews); see also Public
Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, supra note 115, at 890-91 (stating that
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nents also argue that it is possible for one juror to engage in a

post-verdict interview, and subsequently, invade another juror's
privacy." 2

Through the jury's verdict and subsequent interviews, the
public gains knowledge of the message the jury is sending to society through post-verdict interviews.'6 The jury also engages in
subtle policy making.' Since jurors state their decisions and reasoning to the public, these interviews enhance the fact-finding
process as jurors defend their decisions to the public.'" This may,
instead of inhibiting juries, prompt them to take the responsibility
of jury duty more seriously.'" Moreover, the press is not asking to
attend jury deliberations, but only "to learn from the participants
the basis of their verdict." 7 The press' interviews are not an intrusion, but a way of gaining knowledge. However, the relatively
new phenomenon of "checkbook journalism" raises concerns that
post-verdict interviews might corrupt jury deliberations.
E. The Problem of Checkbook Journalism
Opponents argue that post-verdict interviews encourage jurors to render a decision based upon the hopes of enticing, encouraging or playing-up to the media;' a contention reinforced by
"checkbook journalism."6 ' Jurors who write and sell stories about
their trial experience to the press 7 ° present a problematic issue."17
72
and writing books
Selling stories to tabloid television shows

has become a means to substantial monetary gain.""

Because of

public pressures could discourage jurors from reaching unpopular verdicts).
162. United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133, 1142 (Ind. 1982).
163. Raspkof, supra note 114, at 373-74.
164. See id. at 373 (stating that the jury's verdict can set the "limits of selfdefense, the boundaries of the defense of insanity, and the permissibility of
certain types of protest against government policies").
165. Nunn, supra note 12, at 429.
166. Id.

167. Aaron, supra note 17, at 229-30.
168. Nunn, supra note 12, at 429.
169. Gaza, supra note 115, at 335-37.
170. Id. at 335; 1 GOODALE, supra note 1, at 28. As a result of the O.J. Simp-

son trial, California produced legislation which "restricts jurors in criminal
cases from selling their stories-or even discussing such a sale-before
[ninety] days have passed after the close of the trial." Id. However, as applied to a discharged Simpson juror, this statute was declared unconstitutional. Id. The court was unconvinced that the waiting period would reduce
pressure on jurors to sell their stories. Id.
171. Gaza, supra note 115, at 335; Jesse Katz, Participantsin King Case try
to Cash in, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1993, at A17.
172. Katz, supra note 171.

173. Id.; O.J. JurorBrands Fuhrmana 'Snake' in book, Foreman Says she
did not believe a word Detective said, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1996, § 1, at 3.
174. Gaza, supra note 115, at 335-36. Two jurors from the Bernard Goetz
trial were paid $2500 and almost $5000 for their stories. Id. A juror from the
famous Pennzoil-Texaco case reportedly received at least $10,000 for his book.
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the phenomenon of checkbook journalism, the question now becomes whether a juror is doing his civic duty by serving on the
panel or simply anticipating some easy cash down the road.15 The
concern over checkbook journalism is similar to the concern that
juries make decisions in anticipation of basking in the media spotlight and reaping the rewards of being a celebrity.
Currently, no law prohibits profiting from one's trial experience. 7 Legally, celebrity-minded or profit-motivated jurors are
doing nothing wrong. However, prohibiting the press from conducting informative post-verdict interviews seems unjust if jurors
are then allowed to sell their trial memoirs to the highest bidder.
Restricting the press from performing its constitutionally protected newsgathering right because of conflicting interests is unreasonable if jurors are then authorized to sell their stories for a
profit.
F. The Concernsfor the Rights of CriminalDefendents
Finally, one of the strongest arguments against allowing postverdict interviews is the infringement of the accused's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial. 77 Defendants have a Sixth
Amendment right to an unbiased jury, free from public opinion
and influence. 78 Opponents claim that when the public's right
conflicts with the accused's right, "the accused's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial must, as a matter of logic, take precedence over
the public's First Amendment right of access."179 To ensure fair-

ness to the defendant, juries deliberate in private, trying to decide
a verdict based solely upon the evidence.180

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)18 ' safeguards the integrity of
Id. at 336; see also Katz, supra note 171. The foreman from the Rodney King
beating case received an undisclosed sum for his appearance on "Inside Edition." Katz, supra note 171.
175. Katz, supra note 171.
176. Id.
177. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986); United
States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that postverdict juror interviews would not deny the defendants a fair trial because the
trial was over); United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 723-24 (D. Mass.
1987). See also Gaza, supra note 115, at 315.
178. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 724; Gaza, supra note 115, at 315.
179. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1984).
180. PublicDisclosures of Jury Deliberations,supra, note 115, at 888-89. See
Goldstein, supra note 18, at 295-96; see also Gaza, supra note 115, at 315.
181. The Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
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a verdict or an indictment. This rule excludes the use of juror testimony concerning matters or statements arising in deliberations
and concerning the effects of any influences upon jurors' mental
processes in connection with a verdict. 18 2 Under this rule, a juror
may testify after the verdict only to "extraneous influences" upon
him or her.8 3 These influences include illegal methods of decision,

applying personal knowledge or "expressions by the judge for a
desire for a conviction."84
In a proceeding impeaching the verdict, Rule 606(b) prohibits
juror testimony of conversations, mistakes, motives, biases, and
miscommunications among jurors; the courts do not consider these
to be "extraneous influences." 1' The policy considerations for this
are to stimulate honest and free discussions inside the jury room,
to reduce juror harassment and to encourage the finality of jury
verdicts.'86 Since this impeachment rule mainly concerns the
courts' use of juror testimony to set aside verdicts, courts require
misconduct be shown by "clear and unquestionable evidence,"
"strong evidence," or "clear evidence."'87
However, because courts require a preliminary showing of
misconduct before allowing jurors to testify in a judicial hearing,
Rule 606(b) allows the interviewing of willing jurors out of court.'8
Furthermore, since jurors' "descriptions of their own mental processes" 189 may not be the subject of juror testimony, courts will not
allow suggestions that public opinion swayed a jury verdict as impeachment testimony.'

Some defendants claim that they are prevented from determining if their Fifth Amendment' 9' right to a fair trial or their
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence
of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
182. Susan Crump, Is The BroadExclusionary Principalof Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 509 (1988).
183. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 299.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Crump, supra note 182, at 512.
187. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 299-300.
188. Id. at 300.
189. Id. at 299.
190. See id. (noting that common law and statutes prohibits a juror from
testifying as to his or her "beliefs, biases, motives, mistakes, miscalculations,
or misunderstandings" in order to impeach a verdict).
191. The United States Constitution states:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in ac-

tual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
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Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated if courts
prevent them from speaking with jurors. 92 However, the "First
Amendment right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory
assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant of that right
[to a fair trial]." 93 Further, since the press conducts post-verdict
interviews at the trial's conclusion, no possibility exists that allowing jurors to speak to the media would deprive the defendant to a
fair trial." Thus, the "free press-fair trial" issue is not applicable
concerning post-verdict interviews. 9'
III. SUMMARY-THE NEED FOR A STANDARD POLICY
In each case discussed in this Comment, the trials themselves
had huge public followings.9
After the each verdict, in order to
complete its news coverage of the case, the media wanted to speak
with the dismissed jurors. 97 As a result of the press' attention, the
courts presiding over these trials either prohibited the interviews
altogether or placed restrictions upon the press.9 ' While courts
use different tests and standards in determining whether to allow
the press post-verdict access, the concerns over the post-verdict interviews are consistent. Assuming that the press can invoke its
right under the First Amendment to include post-verdict access,"9
a court must weigh this right against the interests of the accused,
the rights of the individual jurors and the interest in protecting
the function of the jury system. Courts make three distinct choices
when dealing with the post-verdict interview issue. Some courts
prohibit the press from communicating with the jurors completely.
Other courts limit the press' access to jurors. Still others allow the
self, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
192. Stone, supra note 130, at 183.
193. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1986).
194. United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978).
195. Id.; Aaron, supra note 17, 231-32. In his article, Aaron argues that
both the Sixth Amendment and Article III of the United States Constitution
cannot be protected interests which would overcome the presumption against
post-verdict interview restrictions. Aaron, supra note 17, 231-32. Aaron
states that interests protected by the Sixth Amendment or Article III cannot
overcome the presumption of the constitutionality of post-verdict interviews
for several reasons. Id. at 231. First, the First Amendment interests must
outweigh countervailing state interests. Id. Second, the Sixth Amendment
protects defendants against adverse acts of the government, not the press. Id.
Third, Article III does not aid in the analysis of post-verdict interview cases.
Id. Thus, interests protected by the Sixth Amendment or Article III are not
applicable to post-verdict interview issues. Id. at 231-32.
196. Aaron, supra note 17, at 214.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 235.
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press to interview jurors after a verdict has been rendered. The
current split of authority on how to deal with post-verdict interviews is troublesome because it is inconsistent. The need for establishing a standard policy of regulating post-verdict interviews
is great as the quest for these interviews is more prevalent today
then ever before."s
Using the Supreme Court's two-prong test as set forth in
° the press can invoke First
Richmond Newspapers Co. v. Virginia, '"
Amendment protection of post-verdict access to jurors after a trial.
The Court's history of First Amendment expansion to most aspects
of a criminal trial allows the implication of First Amendment
guarantees to extend to post-verdict access. Moreover, the important functions that the public's access to this information give to
the community outweigh any possible detrimental effects postverdict access may have on the judicial system. Therefore, courts
should find that the press has a guaranteed First Amendment
right of access to jurors after a verdict.
However, courts must protect this guaranteed First Amendment right of access without invading the jurors' rights and the
rights of the accused. Giving a court the discretion to control the
post-verdict access is the policy best suited toward protecting each
of these interests. At the end of a trial, a court should determine
whether the proceedings were well-publicized, thus triggering the
press' desire to interview the jurors. The court would then have
the discretion to impound juror names and addresses for the
specified time period of ten days after a verdict before releasing
juror identities to the press. The ten day time period strikes a perfect balance between the competing interests. Ten days is long
enough to allow jurors to return to their normal lifestyle, yet not
so long that the trial loses its newsworthiness. As the Butt, Sullivan and Doherty courts stated, the values promoted by press access to dismissed jurors will be no less advanced several days after
the jury returns a verdict. 2 Although the postponement of the
prompt release of juror identities may diminish slightly the newsworthiness of the trial, "significant news will receive the amount of
publicity it warrants."2 A postponement of ten days will not injure the values served by the press' First Amendment right of access as it functions as the public's watchdog.
Moreover, this break allows jurors time to contemplate what,

200. PublicDisclosures of Jury Deliberations,supra note 115, at 887; Raskopf, supra note 114, at 358.
201. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).

202. Sullivan v. National Football League, 839 F. Supp. 6, 7 (D. Mass. 1993);
United States v. Butt, 753 F. Supp. 44, 45 (D. Mass. 1990); United States v.
Doherty, 675 F. Supp 719, 725 (D. Mass. 1987).
203. United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 119 (5th Cir. 1987).
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if anything, they will discuss with the press. ' This cooling off period allows a juror to reflect upon his service as a "citizen soldier."2' This hiatus allows jurors to decide whether or not to speak
to the press or to remain silent as he or she wishes.
Courts should also warn jurors, through a letter, about overly
aggressive reporters and remind the jurors that they are under no
obligation to speak with anyone regarding their decision.206 This
letter may include ideas on how to handle post-verdict interviews 20 or even suggest a way of protecting the jurors, such as
providing a neutral area where the press can conduct post-verdict
interviews. 2' This letter from the court to each juror allows the
individual to make an educated, informed decision about whether
to participate in any type of post-verdict interview. This standard
policy of impounding juror names and addresses for ten days after
a verdict, coupled with a letter to each juror, satisfies the interest
of each participating party, while still allowing a court control over
the situation.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators alike recognize the benefits that
flow from allowing the media access to jurors following a trial.
However, these benefits are usually discussed within the context
of concern for both the rights of the jurors and the accused. Under
this clash of First Amendment protections, privacy and fair trial
rights, a middle ground recommends itself. This middle ground is
the discretion to impound names and addresses for ten days after
the rendering of a verdict while reminding jurors of their rights to
refuse post-verdict interviews. This middle ground can achieve
proper conditions for the judicial system deliberations while satisfying the desire of the press and the public to remain informed
about this important governmental institution.

204. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 725.
205. See In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 97-8 (1st Cir. 1990)
(stating that jurors are "citizen soldiers" and although it may seem unfair to
have their identities revealed to the media, all soldiers, at times, may be
asked to perform "distasteful duties").
206. See generally Shartel, supra note 125, at 2 (suggesting that judges
warn jurors about potential harassment by the media and remind jurors that
refusing any interview is within the individual juror's discretion).
207. 1 GOODALE, supra note 1, at 25-26. Jurors can refuse to participate in
post-verdict interviews and should harassment occur, jurors may seek help
from the courts. Id.
208. Id.

